War strategies: Israel vs Egypt in the Sinai

In an article published in the official magazine of the Israeli army, Ehud Eilam, representative of the magazine in the USA, and lecturer and researcher of Israel's national security and military affairs, describes the scenario for a potential war between Egypt and Israel. Ehud Eilam believes that the Egyptian revolution and the dramatic political strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood could create friction between Egypt and Israel. One of several reasons, he posited, is the demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula and Hamas’s links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Under extremely severe circumstances, a conventional conflict might transpire between the two countries, even if on a limited scale, he conceded. Eilam predicts that components from previous conflicts between the  two countries will bear significant weight and the battle, he believes, will take place in the Sinai. Despite the changes that have occurred in the past few decades concerning their respective military capabilities,  combat patterns from the 1948-1973 wars will still remain relevant, while adapting to the realities of the present. Achieving aerial superiority will remain a central component in order to provide assistance to the various ground and naval forces through aerial bombardment, transfer of supplies, and providing intelligence. "Aerial bombardment would be very efficient in exposed terrains such as the Sinai, in which ground units would be vulnerable to attacks from the air, as was proven in 1967," the military expert wrote. He also pointed out the strength of the Egyptian Air Force which he said has over two-hundred F-16 aircraft while adding a note of caution to Israel that it may find itself preoccupied with many conflicts at the same time, including Iran and Hezbollah, and perhaps even a campaign against Hamas and Syria, which will disrupt its efforts towards consolidating its aerial strength against Egypt. In light of this, Eilam wrote, "it is possible that no side will benefit from total air superiority, at least during the opening stages of a campaign between Israel and Egypt. Furthermore,the Egyptian anti-aircraft capability may disrupt bombings on its forces. It should therefore be taken into consideration that it may not be possible to decide the campaign in Sinai through the use of air fire alone, requiring the back up of ground forces." Thus,  he warned "a mutual ground campaign could develop." "The operational goal of each side will be to destroy the enemy forces and push them out of Sinai. This conflict will include situations which Israel has not experienced in battle since 1982, such as anti-artillery combat and absorbing air attacks. Other situations will be completely new, for example if both Israel and Egypt employ their navies and take their battle to sea, either in the Red Sea or the Mediterranean, for the first time since 1973." The use of thousands of advanced weapons systems similar to the ones used by the US  including F-16 fighter jets and M-113 armoured personnel carrier,  represent another unique component, compared to previous conflicts, and one which would increase the probability of "friendly fire."  Both sides may also carry out vertical air outflanking for the purpose of capturing vital positions, as Israel did in 1956, or for positioning ambushes or creating obstructions such as the landings carried out by by Egyptian commando forces in 1973. Ehud foresees that Israeli forces would have a relatively easy time penetrating the expanse of the Sinai in the absence of fortified Egyptian military areas, which is in contrast to the situation in 1956 and 1967, when breaching the Um Katef and Raffiah sectors was required. In 1973, the Egyptian military had no need to overcome the obstacle of the Suez Canal when heading towards northern Sinai. However, should the Egyptian military surprise Israeli forces with a rapid manoeuvre at the start of the conflict, Israel would have to be prepared to carry out counter-attacks in order to halt, or at least delay, the Egyptian advance until the arrival of reserve units, as happened at the start of the Yom Kippur War. Moreover he indicated that from a military perspective, it is possible, if only due to considerations of pride and national honour, that the Egyptian military will receive an order to prevent Israeli forces from achieving any ground-based achievement, meaning that it uses forward defence close to the border with Israel. This approach may prove costly to Egypt, as it did in 1956 and 1967, not to mention that the Egyptian military will not have infrastructure at its disposal in northern Sinai, as it did in 1956 and 1967. " Israeli forces would face a similar dilemma if they penetrated into the depths of the Sinai Peninsula. If fighting continues, even in the framework of attrition, an Israeli military presence in the heart of Sinai will lead to the establishment of infrastructure similar to that of the 1960s. The gradual transition of Israeli bases to the Negev, which is strengthening the existing layout that currently exists there vis-à-vis Egypt, will also assist an Israeli deployment in the Sinai. Another option at Israel's disposal is to embrace a portable defence across the peninsula or to stay in the Negev and burst into Sinai solely for the sake of operative raids. This means the entrance into Sinai for the purpose of maximum destruction of an Egyptian force, followed by a withdrawal back to the Negev. The variety of challenges faced by Israel should a conflict occur with Egypt, necessitates essential manpower qualification" The article concluded that despite the capability of Israel's soldiers to adapt to changing circumstances, it would not be enough,  in light of his focus on fighting guerrilla and terrorism in recent decades, rather than fighting a conventional military. "Overall, Egypt and Israel have many reasons across every platform not to engage on the battlefield. However, a confrontation might occur against the will of one and perhaps even the wills of both countries. Therefore, Israel must be prepared for a potential conflict with Egypt. As well as preparing for combat from all directions, primarily Hezbollah, it is important that Israel's conventional combat capability should also be nurtured", he concluded.